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Abstract  
With the euro, european citizens have a concrete symbol of their belonging to a same 
community. But Europe always belongs to the field of resources, for most of the political 
authorities, national interest. This article contains some thoughts and answers to the following 
questions: can a euro contribute to the building of a european identity?  
 
Since the first of January 2002, citizens of twelve Member States of the European Union (EU) 
use the same currency in their daily lives. At that time, around 56 billion coins and 13 billion 
euro banknotes were ready to circulate. At the same time political challenge, economic challenge 
and social challenge, the euro alone represents a double revolution. First, it implies, for countries 
that are part of the euro area, the disappearance of the largest symbols of national sovereignty, 
currencies, as well as the transfer of national monetary sovereignties to a European Central Bank. 
The euro is also a big change for citizens. By nature, monetary instruments are social bonds, 
symbols of unity and assembly. In addition to the concrete interest of consumers in the concrete 
effects of the single currency on their financial situation, the introduction of the euro upsets the 
monetary references that they have built up in their currencies of education. 
This article aims to provide some insights and answers to the following question: can the euro 
contribute, as a symbol, to the construction of a "European identity"? The "proclamation of 
identity" is one of the privileged means of mobilizing and channeling the passions or political 
emotions that are set in motion in the name of a project, and this is often done through culture1. 
In the official Community discourse, the euro is supposed to reinforce "the unity of the European 
Union" and "the sense of European identity," and become "a symbol of European identity." 
However, the challenge is to both build momentum and adapt to very different national realities, 
because changing money can be seen as a change of identity. We do believe that the euro is a 
concrete symbol of belonging to the same community, but that European identity will not easily 
result, at least in the immediate future. It will take time, a lot of willingness and a greater 
openness. 
I - "European identity": the false trail of a notion and its derivatives 
A - The notion of identity 
In practice, "identity is played out in variation". Identity is a state, a construction that depends on 
the context; it is not immutable, it can disappear and reappear. It is "an evolutionary construct 
that gives meaning and value (positive or negative) to a relationship or a set of relationships." 
Identity comes under three types of reports. The first is the relation to the past, which consists of 
showing the roots of the community, of proving its permanence in time, of inventing traditions, 
in short to confer a perenniality. The second is the relationship to space and sociality in which it 
is a question of establishing a sense of ownership, a place where power is exercised. The third is 
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the relation to culture: it is the most complex relationship, which consists of modifying values 
and erecting cultural traits as emblems of identity. 
The identity of a group or society is what ensures its continuity and cohesion. On the one hand, it 
determines how a society stands out from its natural environment; on the other hand, it 
establishes the mode of belonging of individuals to their society, at the same time fixing the 
conditions of their exclusion. Identity expresses the values of a given society, and it is in it that 
individuals derive their own qualities, as members of the community. These qualities are modes 
of being and are manifested by actions. 
Individual identity is complementary to the collective identity. Whereas in the individual identity 
the individual perceives himself in relation to the others ("I" in relation to "Others"), in the case 
of the collective identity he identifies himself with a collectivity or a community, which itself 
identifies with the outside world ("We" versus "Others"). 
In all cases, the identity assumed the Other to exist and develop: an identity is define themselves 
in relation to others is to have its own perception of self and others. 
We must not deduce the existence of a common memory when there has been common 
experience. Membership does not necessarily lead to the formation of an organized group. The 
boundaries of identity are fuzzy and fluid, so fluid. Identity must be articulated according to 
oppositions and differences. It must accept the existence of a plurality of voices that are not 
necessarily immediately harmonizable, but are able, in principle, to communicate and dialogue 
by exchanging experiences. "Do I really have an identity? Alfred Grosser wonders. My identity 
is "the sum of my belongings (...) plus, I hope, something that synthesizes and dominates them." 
Most identities are "locked". 
The collective identity of a people is never simple and spontaneous. Bertrand Badie speaks of 
"identity volatility" in the sense that individuals are no longer just citizens of a nation state, but 
also belong to a set of networks. Since the latter generally deny any territorial logic, the 
individual is doubly situated in the contemporary political world: on the one hand, it is situated 
territorially by virtue of its citizen relation; on the other hand, it is socially located because of its 
membership of multiple networks. The individual modifies the hierarchy of his belongings and 
his identity references according to the situations and the stakes. This "volatility" strongly 
relativises the notion of territory and territorial belonging. 
Identity is inseparable from power relations, whether state or not: it is according to systems of 
power that meaning and value are conferred on relations between groups. The fact that a political 
power is equipped with institutions gives a particular dimension to identity. The process of 
identity construction certainly imposes a certain harmonization around a core of feelings shared 
by a large part of the population: it aims at harmonizing, and not at uniformizing, the diversity 
inherent in any community, and does not should in no way be akin to manipulation. But for 
Alfred Grosser, it's almost impossible. For him, the notion of "collective memory" is "doubly 
contestable": on the one hand, the number of my social belongings carries particular memories, 
and on the other hand, the number of my own leaves, it is not a question of memory since "I do 
not remember taking the Bastille". The "collective memory" is an acquired, a transmitted, which 
implies both selection and distortion. 
B - Europe faces its identities 
The formation of an identity is generally perceived as a real stake for the future of Europe. 
Identity itself implies "special solidarity". It is a complex feeling, a set of representations 
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referring to a history (with roots, permanence in time, traditions, in short, durability), to a place 
where power is exercised, to practices, and a collective project. It involves both ideal and real, 
emotional and rational elements; it requires the little "something" of which Alfred Grosser spoke 
above. 
Far from being fixed and static, "European identity" appears as a constant effort of unification, 
integration and harmonization by and between European countries in different fields. It is 
constructed in the confrontation of the identical and the otherness, the similarity and the 
differences between the European peoples and the other peoples (see Kirrane [2003]). 
In a report presented to the European Council in Lisbon in June 1992, the European 
Commission, in order to clarify the contours of Europe in the perspective of enlargement, 
explicitly recognized that it was "neither possible nor appropriate" to define the borders of the 
European Union whose contours will be built "over time". It has just confirmed the diversity, 
richness, and importance of geographical, historical, and cultural elements, ideas, and values. 
Europe is an "uncertain notion", so that of "European identity" is too! Perhaps we should evoke 
the "European spirit" or the "European civilization": the unity of this continent would exist 
underlying, because there would be a European civilization, successively transcending 
feudalism, the system of states, the system of nations. The idea is seductive, but discouraging. 
Edgar Morin speaks of "metamorphic identity" in the sense that modern Europe is the fruit of a 
metamorphosis, she herself lived metamorphoses, and that his identity is defined in 
metamorphoses. Born of the "historical whirlwind" of the fifteenth century, Europe has forged 
itself from opposition, and is built "in organizing anarchy". At the same time, it presents "the two 
faces of the most welcoming universalism and the most narrow-minded individualism". Its 
richness lies in its variety. 
Should we rather speak of "European citizenship"? Cynthia Jean also notes that in this area the 
historical, social and cultural realities of states are deeply rooted in their political behavior, and 
make the triumph of a minimalist approach that combines slowness and prudence. States also 
continue to believe that strengthening the rights of European citizenship can threaten national 
identity, which undermines the scope and meaning of Union citizenship. States jealously defend 
their sovereign powers, they owe their differences, even more than to their common points, they 
do not seem ready to abandon themselves to the construction of a European collective identity. 
Europe does not have an identity that is deeply and uniformly rooted: this memory is divided and 
confrontational, and the sovereignty of the nation-states that compose it is both a force and a 
weakness. "The European will inevitably be less attached to Europe than the French to France, 
than Germany to Germany." 
"The nation is first an idea, not a reality as can be family, tribe, or clan. It presupposes a high 
stage of conceptual elaboration, with the assimilation of a common history, the acquisition of a 
heritage of memories organized in collective memory, and the submission of this memory to a 
work of symbolization which gives it meaning, around places of memory and symbols. 
The national conscience is the fruit of a long historical elaboration, it is not innate. There is no 
nation without conscience to be one; there is no national consciousness that is not the result of a 
common past integrated in the present, that is, a common way of life, and the possibility of joint 
action. In reality, the problem is not to create a fictitious identity, but to preserve its own heritage 
(its memory) in its own identity. 
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Europe, like the nation, is not only a political and economic construct, but also a mental 
construct. It requires a story, a memory, symbols, myths, places of memory. Europe is not a 
nation, but nations. 
The notion of "European identity" is, in our opinion, inappropriate. "Europe does not exist", but 
"Europeans exist". They do not know who they are, but they know that they are not the others, 
and others also recognize them. 
As Jean-Baptiste Duroselle would say, "If I happen to be in the Midwestern United States, 
meeting a Hungarian or a Spaniard gives me a meeting with compatriots in a foreign country. . 
But at Harvard I find myself less abroad than in the Flemish or Bavarian countryside. In many 
ways, I feel culturally and intellectually closer to Leopold Senghor than to my best English or 
Dutch friend, which does not detract from friendship. And when I am told that Europe is the 
country of law, I think of arbitrariness; that it is the country of human dignity, I think of racism; 
that it is that of reason, I think of romantic dreaming. And I find justice in Pennsylvania, human 
dignity among Arab nationalists, reason everywhere in the universe. "Europe is not incompatible 
with maintaining elements of cultural diversity. Cultural homogeneity is not required, and even 
undesirable, and in any case impossible. In France, the Group of People's Banks wanted to 
prepare for the changeover to the euro by training its staff and informing the interested public 
outside. The "training suitcase" which included two separate versions, one for external 
communication and the other for the internal training of the group's banks, became a problem 
when the group wanted to carry out a translation material for its Spanish subsidiaries: a literal 
transposition proved impossible for questions of language, culture, and too different networks, 
and an adaptation was necessary. 
We are dealing more with "a vast multicultural DIY" than with the emergence of a "European 
identity". It is a "cultural universe of compromise" that involves the bringing together of 
different national cultures, including the combination does not rest on any relationship of 
subordination, but combines unity and diversity, the homogeneous and the different, the 
universal and the relative. This is the specificity of the community political configuration: no 
culture claims to impose its hegemony on others; contact is part of a process defined as 
voluntarist, concerted and irreversible: it is inseparable from a historical project. 
Cultural differences are one of Europe's strengths. It is even better to speak of "cultural 
coexistence" rather than "multiculturalism". This expression has the advantages of being modest 
(it recalls that the relationship between European cultural forms is not resolved) and dynamic (it 
implies permanent adjustments, therefore an open situation, and not an organization of relations 
between cultures). It means that neither the problem of identity, nor that of the management of 
differences are solved. To speak of cultural cohabitation has the advantage of pointing out, 
unlike multiculturalism, that "everything has to be done". What is at stake is the political and 
cultural awareness of a community belonging to Europe. 
Max Weber would then speak of "communalisation". It is a social relationship characterized by 
the disposition of social activity that is based on the "subjective" feeling (traditional or 
emotional) of participants belonging to the same community. To share certain qualities, to know 
the same situation or to have the same behavior, does not necessarily constitute a 
communalisation. It is only when, because of a "common feeling", individuals mutually orient 
one another in one way or another that a social relation is born between them. 
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The difficulty for the EU lies in two characteristics that distinguish it from traditional community 
groups. Unlike nation-states with well-defined territories, Europe defines itself as an open space: 
we cannot set the final limits; it is a large-scale community, encompassing a multiplicity of 
different populations and traditions. Moreover, it is a community under construction, continually 
planned. The difficulty comes from the fact that one proceeds in anticipation, in the name of a 
project to build, tending towards an ideal whose realization is always postponed in an ill-
determined future. 
There is a real gap between the discourse of the Community and the social and cultural reality of 
citizens who do not recognize themselves in this discourse. Community discourse is dominated 
by universalising values, with no European specificities. A differentiated approach adapted to the 
national context is essential to the success of the approach. It is therefore the responsibility of the 
Member States and opinion leaders to remedy the situation. Information and communication play 
their role of integration only within nation-states or sufficiently constituted communities, 
possessing the social and cultural substitute that grounds the symbolic and cultural space of 
politics. Otherwise, they are not enough to create a cultural dynamic and may, on the contrary, 
have a destabilizing effect. 
II - The euro, symbol of Europeans 
A - The concept of symbol 
The symbol is a means of identification, a sign of recognition and rallying between members of 
the same community. Transmitted to the generations through folklore, tales, myths and legends, 
it is part of a collective and cultural inheritance. 
Symbols are indispensable to the construction of any lasting identity, whether individual or 
collective. By identifying with symbols, the individual or group acquires a personality that 
allows him to fit into the social order: symbolism puts an end to the crisis of identity and the 
floating of opinion. 
In order to ensure its reproduction, modern society temporarily invests objects, characters, 
events, or any other form of social discourse, and confers on them an interface value between 
meanings (borrowed from a corpus of truths, mythical or religious) and their real function, which 
is thus masked, and thus makes it possible to legitimize, by association or by analogy, new 
practices, supposed to be carriers of the future, that is to say of an unavoidable program. 
We necessarily combine memory and program, the memory of an event or a founding person, 
and the prescription of practices associated with it. These practices must be anchored in a 
mythological fund old or traditional. A shared belief inherited from tradition may account for the 
compulsory adherence to certain practices that are otherwise necessary for the reproduction of 
the social system. The myth legitimizes the rite: the second cannot exist without the first. Life in 
society cannot, therefore, not meet legal or moral rules, or reciprocal commitments or organized 
constraint: it must be based on deeply held beliefs, on a set of principles that are going to say, 
compliance with which ensures the accomplishment by all common practices. 
The usefulness of symbols for political power is undeniable. The symbol is mediator and 
unifying. As a concrete representative of the community, he affirms, maintains and strengthens 
membership and adherence to a common system of values and actions; it mobilizes and brings 
people together, and thus facilitates consensus. On the other hand, the symbol encourages respect 
for social norms and models, and promotes the maintenance of order and solidarity. Thus the 
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scepter and the crown, besides signaling the power, invite to respect it. Symbols not only reflect 
authority, they reinforce it. 
The symbol has the great advantage of being imprecise and subjective, but without being 
arbitrary; he always responds to a social and political necessity. It appeals to emotion, to our 
creative mind and to our imagination. We do not understand it, we interpret it. As a result, it can 
be shared by many people, but not necessarily interpreted by all in the same way. 
B - Currency as a symbol 
Belonging to a payment community in which the means of payment are established, the currency 
is a sign of social recognition. Since the symbol itself is a sign of social recognition, money is 
therefore a symbol. It is a symbol by its nature of instrument, and by its iconography. It is at the 
same time one of the manifestations and one of the instruments of a strong process of symbolic 
and affective identification, constituting the group. A relationship is created when the goods and 
services are transferred, and this transfer must balance the relationship. 
The first monetary instruments were already symbols. Some peoples have indeed ignored the 
intrinsic value and the weight of the standard to consider only the symbol. For example, several 
tons of "bush axes" were found in an area from northern Scotland to southern France, and from 
Ireland to eastern Poland, with high concentrations along the roads - commercial ones. The 
delicate nature, and the small size of the decorated bronze arches in bronze, of different sizes, 
which can be dated around 1000 BC. BC, excluded all utilitarian use: the tranquatic form 
symbolically expressed the settlement of debts and the rebalancing of social relations. We find 
this type of objects on different continents at about the same time. The oldest known mint coins 
in China belonged to the Zhou kings of the late sixth century BC. The Chinese traders also used 
knives, consisting of a ring attached to a handle; with time, successive disappearance of the blade 
and the handle led in the third century BC to keep only the ring, that is to say a coin with holes. 
Africa also used such exchange instruments, such as the iron anvil in Congo, or the copper cross 
of Katanga. 
In antiquity, the pieces were symbols, signs of recognition. They first allowed the distribution of 
a symbol of power among the members of the city. When the warriors were reviewed by the 
king, a coin was distributed to each of them so that the relation to the king was direct and a unit 
was created: it was the census. By this gesture, the king gave a pledge of his confidence and of 
his sacred and protective authority. The warrior then held a sign of the king's recognition and a 
mark of belonging to the royal army. It was a question of counting the soldiers, of affirming the 
social unity of the royal authority and of keeping the troops loyal. 
Jean-Michel Servet shows that the coins appeared in Greece before the commercial development, 
not directly as a means of payment, but as a need to standardize, to codify social relations 
troubled in particular by the extension of so-called commercial transactions. They have gradually 
defined a new political equilibrium in a growing number of cities. These, as political institutions, 
have played a key role in their use and propagation. 
For Michel Pastoureau, historian of symbols, money is the sign of cohesion between those who 
use these same objects. Moreover, not only do these users see the symbols, but they touch them: 
to touch the portrait of the King or his motto was, according to him, "a symbolic act, not 
neutral." 
Money is above all one of the forms of the social relation, characterized by the acceptance of a 
specific object as a means of exchange of goods, services or immaterial possessions. Even the 
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relationship between creditors and debtors, lenders and borrowers is a social bond. The act of 
lending and borrowing is not only an exchange of money, but also a cultural exchange that varies 
according to the social groups. 
Money is a "total social fact". It symbolizes political sovereignty, at the same time as it 
constitutes the nutritive liquid essential for all economic activity, as well as a powerful social 
bond. Money is a human and social phenomenon, in that it incorporates all the components of 
life into society (cultural, political, social, economic) and ensures the regulation of all social 
relations. 
The changeover to the euro with the introduction of coins and notes is a total change in consumer 
habits. This Grand Passage is not only a technical and economic operation, but also a historical, 
political, social and cultural innovation. The euro has revolutionized everyday life, and 
inevitably encountered resistance (interests, habits, fear). Money is not only an instrument at the 
service of power, but also an instrument at the service of the citizens, of which the success of the 
currency depends. Although it is still too early to say, the emergence of the euro should improve 
citizens' sense of belonging to the EU and help to forge a sense of European identity. But this 
notion of "European identity" is in our opinion inadequate; it is very likely that the euro favors a 
sense of belonging, a social bond between Europeans. In this sense, with the euro, we prefer to 
speak of a "symbol of belonging" rather than a "factor of European identity". 
C - The euro, a symbol of belonging 
Symbols are essential for the construction of any sustainable collective identity. A community of 
states such as the EU also needs such symbols, as they are expected to play an important role in 
the process of legitimation. For the time being, the symbolism of European integration is weak. 
Admittedly, there are, among others, the European flag, the European anthem, the European 
passport and the Community driving license. But it is the euro that is the last and true big 
European symbol. We have seen that money has a very strong relationship with political power, 
and that it is a factor of unity and a means of social integration. To perceive too much the 
economic and technical dimensions of money leads to forgetting its great power of political and 
cultural integration. The euro will have this power because money is certainly the symbol of a 
community of individuals. 
The euro was coined on Friday, 13 December 1996 at the seat of the Irish Bank for banknotes 
and on 16 June 1997 at the Amsterdam European Council for coins. The process of printing and 
issuing coins and notes had to answer many questions about the number of cuts and coins, their 
face value, their sequence, the range of options for graphics, legal-institutional and logistical 
problems, choice of graphic themes, safety signs, practical aspects of launching (time, technical 
feasibility, costs, public acceptance, political considerations, prevention of counterfeiting). 
A currency is a factor of identity; the euro should therefore be one of them. But changing money 
is difficult because we are all suspicious of the unknown. Uncertainty is the first and most 
important of all transition costs, and the first technical risk factor. Founder of the social bond in 
its principle, by the common reference that it institutes, money is also disruptive in its practice. 
The changeover to the euro has not been a monetary reform or a devaluation. Concretely, it was 
a change of unit of account in full respect of the continuity of values and of all private or public 
contractual relations, implying for citizens to divide prices and units of values expressed in their 
national currency by a constant factor. The conversion rates were fixed on 1 January 1999 and 
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corresponded to the equilibrium exchange rates of each of the national currency units vis-à-vis 
the other euro area monetary units and vis-à-vis of the euro. 
In practice, the changeover to the euro has been an "intellectual leap" depending on the behavior 
of the general public, but also on the possibilities of the various stakeholders and the existing 
infrastructure. The organization of the transition was the responsibility of the Member States. 
The situation in each of them varied according to the currency in circulation and the logistical 
infrastructure of the money supply (eg the value of banknotes and coins in circulation in relation 
to the GDP, the importance of the network of respective national central banks, the density of the 
network of ATMs distributing banknotes and the capacity to convert them rapidly to the euro). 
A society is not a fixed whole, it is always evolving, but not at a uniform pace. Several groups, 
each with its own system of representation (beliefs, values, models), coexist or enter into the 
world in conflict (families, ethnic groups, classes). This complexity is reinforced when there is 
coexistence, generally conflictual systems of representations and beliefs heterogeneous, because 
it is a question of reconciling these systems and establishing a unity of meaning. Europe is 
precisely a "polycentric cultural reality". 
Currency is such a close and common good that we sometimes forget the importance and the 
intimacy of the relationship that is established between the citizen and himself. The introduction 
of the euro is not just a set of technical rules. Money, according to Member States and 
individuals, conveys a set of values and ideals; the preparation of economic agents and the 
general public for its introduction could not be confined to practical arrangements, in this case 
the physical characteristics of coins and notes denominated in euro, which should be as easy to 
use as possible. It was necessary to take into account the questions of public opinion, its 
reactions of mistrust and its concerns. Different approaches existed to represent and explain the 
euro to European citizens, they varied according to national cultures and practices; they required 
a great deal of caution because the evocation of money could provoke emotional reactions. Thus, 
it was first necessary to convince a large part of Deutsche Bank's staff of the advantages brought 
by the euro so that it could then "sell" the euro to the customer. 
The currency has an undeniable symbolic content. But every symbol is based on an affective 
dimension. Changing money involves rebuilding all its benchmarks, its value scales, its memory 
of prices and courses. Adopting the euro is indeed a big break with the past, in terms of name, 
value and form. In fact, the consumer has acquired some knowledge from experience and, faced 
with this loss of monetary references, he must build new ones. We also believe that this new 
acquisition and the confidence associated with it has not been fully manifested before the daily 
and manual use of money. Institutional guarantee elements are not the only ones to build 
confidence in money: the symbolism linked to money, as well as the daily monetary practice of 
the players also play a big role. 
Emma Bonino, former European Commissioner responsible for Consumer Policy and Protection 
of Health, made the point very clearly of the need to take into account the symbolic dimension of 
money in order to draw the appropriate consequences for it building confidence in the euro. It 
speaks of "mother money" or "currency of education", that is, the currency in which one has 
learned to count, in which one has been educated, in which one appreciates the value things. This 
currency constitutes the great challenge of the introduction of the euro. The consumer must learn 
the euro, rebuild his value scales and his memory of prices, in short learn a new "monetary 
language". Coexistence between different denominations produces a long period of time when 
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users are asked, in a way, to become bilingual. "It's a bit like learning a language, it takes time 
and practice before you can 'think' in the new unit. 
"The dollar is a good example of a vector information on relative price, that is to say, it performs 
a similar function to that of an inter- national language" understood "by all, for example by a 
Saudi exporter who sells oil to an Italian importer. "Thus, the use of the dollar, as well as the use 
of English, saves the means of communication necessary to transmit the information.  "EMU has 
political, economic and cultural implications that go well beyond the traditional concerns of 
consumer policy as such. It is easy to explain the benefits of the euro to consumers, most of them 
can see it first as a "problem", and especially at the time of transition. They could, and still can, 
feel like "strangers in their own country". That is why it is essential to pay attention not only to 
the economic, physical or logistical problems, but also to the psychological and social aspects of 
the transition. These aspects are essentially about what we call "the weight of habit". A good is 
defined as a monetary instrument in relation to a network of uses in which groups, individuals 
and institutions participate. 
Money is the vehicle of particularly durable traditions, sometimes more resistant to the onslaught 
of time than the metal from which it is made. The weight of habits is expressed essentially in 
three ways: by the psychological price, by the handling of coins and notes, and by the 
immobilization of monetary types. 
An identical sum appears to awaken, in this form, other affective reactions than under another. 
France is a typical example of a habit linked to the psychological price: the "heavy franc" may 
well go back more than forty years, many French have long spoken of "new francs" that they 
converted into "old francs" Which of us, aid a Frenchman before the arrival of the euro, resists 
the urge to "inflate" a sum to better dream of the winnings of the Lotto, to deplore the price of a 
little expensive car or denounce a scandalous situation (on a salary of 13 000 francs, I pay more 
than 300 000 francs of taxes per month)? . 
In most countries, the euro amount is lower than its equivalent in national currency, and gives the 
impression that the salary was reduced. A German monthly wage of around EUR 1 500 replaces 
eg a salary of 3,000 marks, and citizens are necessarily wondering if their salary has not been 
halved ... The level of incomes seems to be decreasing, but so is the level of prices, hence the 
impression of losing wages, but of winning over the prices and the amount of taxes, in fact it is 
"just" a change of scale. in Ireland, the higher nominal values make the conversion appear to be 
inflationary. 
The handling of the euro is carried out with a range of eight coins and seven banknotes. The 
range of national banknotes that circulated in the fifteen EU included four to eight coupures. The 
number issued annually per capita varied from 1 (Finland) to 84 (France) in 1994. Some 
countries use more cash than others, for example Germany compared to France. The biggest euro 
banknote is 500 euros, which corresponds to about 3,000 French francs (FF); gold the biggest 
French ticket was 500FF. This does not offend the Germans, however, who imposed the €500 
denomination because they use more cash (especially large denominations) than checks and 
credit cards; the development of the cash payment in Germany is 1.5 times higher than what 
exists in France. As for the hundredth, it is new for countries which, like Italy, did not have 
submultiples. 
Finally, the weight of habits has always been expressed by the immobilization of monetary types, 
and this for three different but complementary reasons: the still sacred character of royalty and 
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all that can represent it; trust in authority, inspired by the known and respected brands of the 
issuing public authority; and the attachment to graphics. 
The weight of the habit is such that certain currencies had an immense longevity. The British 
gold sovereigns were still stamped "1925" 30 years later! Officially, it was to maintain the 
practice of certain techniques in the monetary workshop. In reality, these sovereigns were, in 
certain trading places, less well-rated than those who carried the effigy of a king. 
When Maria Theresa of Austria (Empress of Austria, Queen of Hungary and Bohemia) died in 
1780, it was customary for her effectiveness to be replaced on each new thaler by that of her 
successor Joseph II. This risked harming the trade in thaler which, from the Levant in Africa to 
Java, was identified with the image of Marie-Thérèse. It was therefore necessary to "save the 
face of the thaler, without prejudicing imperial majesty". After many meetings, debates and 
discussions, the workshops received the order in 1783 to strike a thaler with the effigy of Marie-
Therese, with the date "1780" invariably refrapped ... This thaler thus beaten was strictly re- 
served for export and took the name of "Levant Thaler"; the other thalers were reserved for the 
internal market. 
Changing money is a revolution. Even changing graphics is an event. But that is not always easy: 
here too, tradition and habits play a big role. Athens used the tétradrachme the owl for 5 
centuries (from the fifth to the first century BC.) With no overall change in initial type (Athena 
on the obverse and the owl on the reverse) while Athens was the very advanced era in the artistic 
and aesthetic fields; this conservatism was linked to the success of the currency: it was not daring 
to change its appearance for fear of shaking public confidence ... Whereas in the fifteenth 
century, all the Italian cities adopted the teston, Florence was the only one to refuse it because it 
considered it too revolutionary: then capital of the world trade, it did not want to change its 
monetary types, nor to dethrone its famous gold florin created in 1252; it did not join the teston 
until 1532, when Alexandre de Medici returned in 1532. Venice reasoned in the same way with 
its sequin in 1284 and depicting St. Mark putting the banner back to the city, to the doge 
kneeling. In 1958, to make it easier to accept the passage to the new franc, worth 100 ancient 
francs, it was attached to a typology already known: the Semeuse de Roty. 
The strength of public habits can greatly compromise the effectiveness of a monetary union. If 
the public has become accustomed to certain payment methods or particular types of currencies, 
it may be slow to change and adopt what the new monetary system requires. 
Some factors seem "irrational", but in reality there is no irrationality, only the unpredictable! One 
of the best examples is reported by Philippe Flandrin in his account of the history of thaler, from 
the moment when an order of April 13, 1752 authorized the export of this currency. Exports fell 
from 685,000 pieces in 1768 to 205,000 in 1772. An inquiry was immediately made with the 
Turkish merchants. It appeared at first that this disaffection was due to the competition of Prussia 
and Saxony, which made their own thalers pass through other channels. But the real reason was 
that since 1741, the date of the first strike, Maria Theresa of Austria was represented with a deep 
neck ... which disappeared on the new coins struck after the death of her husband in 1765: she 
appeared veiled there and dressed in a mourning coat. The Levantines, unanimous, demanded 
that the mourning of the Empress of the Holy Roman Empire be ended, otherwise they would 
continue to buy Prussian thalers, Saxons, and even Spanish realms! The Empress was begged to 
give up her mourning clothes in the name of higher economic interests, which she accepted. In 
1776, a new coin was struck with a restored Maria Theresa, and the price of the thaler rose again 
soaring on the foreign exchange market! 
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Economic rationality is one aspect of a larger rationality, that of social life. This aspect is 
provisional and relative. "There is no rationality in itself or absolute rationality. The rational of 
today may be the irrational of tomorrow, the rational of one society may be the irrationality of 
another. "A conduct which seems to us" irrational "according to our criteria finds a rationality of 
its own when it is placed in its social, historical, cultural and political context. The conformity of 
a regime with the system dominating representations and beliefs is not established by a rational 
calculation; it is due to many factors that are largely beyond the control of the leaders. 
Insofar as there is no irrationality but the unforeseeable, the major uncertainty in the case of the 
euro concerns the duration of learning and the nuanced reactions. They vary according to the 
populations concerned, and also according to the individuals, according to a large number of 
variables (age, aptitude for mental calculation, type and extent of the consumption, sparing or 
saving character, sedentary life or not, report to the world, mobility, illiteracy, illiteracy, 
impaired vision, level of poverty, social exclusion, emigrated status, total lack of interest in all 
matters relating to money). It is normal for citizens to be disturbed. The lessons of the other 
monetary reforms teach us that adaptation time, the exact duration of which cannot be known, is 
necessary. In monetary matters, "it is very difficult to react by legal texts against the force of 
things." 
The results of the Eurobarometer carried out between February and May 1996 among 3,778 
"decision-makers" generally show that support for the introduction of the single currency is 
much higher among high-level decision-makers than among the general public. The four main 
reasons given by those in favor are economic, political, commercial and monetary. As for the 
concerns of those who are against, some relate to more psychological aspects such as the fear of 
losing its "symbol of national pride". 
Consumers represent a very differentiated population; their needs in relation to the euro are 
different. As long as the member countries of the Union have not accepted that money is based 
on "fundamentally philosophical fundamentals", we will be close to a monetary 
misunderstanding, or a risk of failure of the euro. Let us consider the specific case of Germany: 
the abandonment of the mark is felt by the Germans as a mourning. 
Germany having been ostracized by the international community after the Second World War, it 
was its economic performance that enabled it to regain its place on the international scene. The 
mark has become a reference currency, it has taken on a symbolic dimension in the German 
collective consciousness, and has become the symbol of the German economic revival, 
especially as Germany has great difficulties with its national symbolism, probably due to 
discontinuities in the history of the country. Like all currencies, the mark is not just a currency, it 
is also a factor of identity, a founding myth. As Chancellor Kohl often reminded them, the 
Germans got their money before having a national anthem or flag. 
D - The international identity of the euro 
In the official discourse EU, the single currency, in addition to its many qualities, will be one of 
the strongest currencies in the world and a factor of international stability (see Kirrane [2003]). 
The EU also defends the idea that, "in fact, Member States will lose a prerogative, which in 
practice they cannot use", and that the euro will offer Europe a consistent monetary weight. its 
economic and commercial role in an international monetary system today dominated by the 
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dollar. The single currency will, according to the EU, be an asset against external shocks: better 
than isolated and dispersed measures, it will strengthen its collective resistance capacity. 
Identity asserts itself in relation to the outside. It is defined both as an affirmation of Self and a 
differentiation of the Other. Therefore, Europe cannot be exclusively defined in itself, it must be 
defined in relation to others, even from their point of view. 
By forcing the Member EU States to show solidarity and overall strength on the international 
stage, the euro will create and reinforce among Europeans themselves the feeling that they have 
shared interests worthy of being defended in common. 
A currency has an international vocation and is accepted abroad only if the issuing State is 
politically and economically powerful. It is a constant throughout the history of money. The 
currencies which dominated the great trade and were widely diffused, were always imitated: the 
barbarian cities which copied Athens' "owl" currencies sought to benefit from the prestige and 
confidence attached to this currency, the value of which was recognized far from its place of 
origin, as far as Sicily, Syria and Egypt. The international success of the British "sovereign" gave 
great prestige to British commerce and maintained the unity of commercial relations; it is even 
said that in Egypt their circulating percentage was higher than that observed in England. 
Each currency is in principle official only in relation to the legal order of the country of issue. 
The status of international money is particularly important. He asks that different conditions be 
fulfilled. A currency is first considered "international" if it fulfills the three functions usual 
means of payment (exchange instrument), unit of account (value standard), and value reserve, 
beyond its emission frontiers. 
Since the use of money outside its country of issue depends mainly on the markets, an 
international currency is more of a transaction instrument and a unit of account than a store of 
value: that is why the number of currencies used at the international level is usually limited to 
one currency, or a very small number (see Kirrane [2003]). This is the case of the dollar. The 
international monetary system is currently dominated by the American currency, "norm-money", 
which fulfills the three functions listed above. The dollar has seen its role grow outside its 
territory and expand geographically. It is an international currency in the sense that, among other 
things, it is either a unit of account for the exchange of goods at the international level (crude 
oil), or a currency in countries where the local currency is weak and unstable. Its stability is the 
key to its success. 
The United States has always been ubiquitous in the EU thinking on the European monetary 
identity. The economic weight of the EU-15 represents more than 30% of GDP global compared 
with 23% for the United States. In 1996, the share of US exports was only 15.2%, but 53% of 
global transactions (foreign exchange, commercial and financial transactions) were made in 
dollars. The economic characteristics of the country of issue, including its share of world trade 
and the size of its economy, are among the decisive factors for the international use of money: 
the larger a country accounts for a large share of world trade, the more its currency is likely to be 
known to traders, and the more it renders services as a unit of account and instrument of 
transaction. The US capital market is the largest and deepest in the world. The EU is the world's 
largest trading power, but the dollar's hegemony is still present. 
A European currency will not only have an impact on the concrete perception of Europe by the 
rest of the world, but also on the same perception by European citizens. As an identity is always 
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defined in relation to the outside world, the international success of the euro will probably 
contribute to creating a real sense of European belonging needs symbols. The euro is one of 
them. It's not just a technical project. And, let's face it, cultural diversity is not a handicap; on the 
contrary, it constitutes an element of balance that must be kept at all costs to avoid phenomena of 
national frustration. 
The ignorance of European mutual histories is great, as shown for example by Franco-German 
relations. The Germans want monetary policy as far as possible free from the right of decision in 
politics; France, on the other hand, considers money as a means at the service of politics. These 
divergences are not theoretical, but are based on historical experiences. 
How to build something together when no one understands the cultural heritages, the references 
and the symbols with which others think? The "common ground" of knowledge of the past is 
indispensable to face the future. It is therefore necessary to overcome ignorance, to deepen the 
knowledge of differences so that mistrust towards one another diminishes. The double work on 
identity consists in valuing everyone's identity and simultaneously opening up to the other's 
knowledge. One accepts to come closer to others if one does not feel threatened by him. 
Europeans are all Europeans, but "they are, simply, in a different way". Confidence is gradually 
built up as mutual knowledge grows ingredient to the co-operation that it is a product of it. 
History shows that money today only has a real status if it fulfills two conditions: to have 
received a definition of public authority and to be accepted by the citizens for whom it is 
intended. Money is a social phenomenon whose use as a means of payment is based on the trust 
that men place in it. The only durable good money is that which enjoys the trust of the users: 
because they deserve it for their intrinsic qualities, and especially because they impose 
themselves by force of circumstances and then enter definitively into the uses and become almost 
a cultural fact. There is a subtle dialectic between private action and institutional creation to 
achieve confidence in the currency. Confidence arises at the same time from institutional 
guarantees, from a pre-existing social climate, from an adequate practice of the actors social, and 
user consensus. Money can be born of a private initiative, or suffer a failure despite its legal 
basis. States are both creators and tributaries of these social and cultural dynamics. 
Therefore, the "process of social integration of money", that is to say the time of integration of 
money in the monetary practices of the actors, is long. An instrument becomes money only from 
the moment it acquires a past, and remains so only if it can be projected into the future by its 
means; the whole problem of the monetary character is therefore limited to memory and 
anticipation. "A thing is not born money: it becomes it," and it even becomes a reprieve, 
according to the variations of the confidence. 
A growing sense of belonging to a common space is needed. It is, so to speak, a looping process: 
a common consciousness is needed for the structures to be accepted and for this consciousness to 
reinforce itself. The impetus is therefore both top and bottom, ie a political will and a common 
sense of belonging on the part of the citizens. 
The euro is the first major European project that involves all citizens to this extent and calls for 
their participation. With the euro, European citizens have the concrete symbol of their belonging 
to the same community. The single European currency will certainly have a power of political 
and cultural integration, and an impact on the concrete perception of Europe by European 
citizens but at the cost of greater openness. (see Kirrane [1996]). For the moment, Europe still 
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belongs to the order of the means, serving an end which, for most political authorities, is still the 
national interest. 
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